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China’s phenomenal growth offers an 
opportunity to boost development in African 
countries. Moreover, China’s loans and 
concessional assistance financed a wide 
range of development projects. China also is 
reaping significant benefits from this 
relationship, through access to raw 
materials, expanded markets for exports of 
manufactures, the establishment of 
investment relationships which could 
generate significant profits over time and 
diplomatic influence. But leadership from 
African governments, particularly to 
strengthen domestic policies and 
governance and to harmonize regional 
policies so as to improve the continent’s 
bargaining position with China, are required 
to ensure that the China-Africa relationship 
contributes to sustainable growth and 
poverty reduction.  The twin goals of this 
paper are to summarizes the analysis on the 
economic exchange between China and 
Africa, and to outline policy 
recommendations to improve the benefits to 
both parties.  
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1. Introduction 
China’s phenomenal growth offers an opportunity to boost development in African countries. In 
2008, trade between Africa and China reached $100 billion and FDI flows from China to Africa 
amounted to $5.4 billion. Moreover, China’s loans and concessional assistance financed a wide 
range of development projects. China also is reaping significant benefits from this relationship, 
through access to raw materials, expanded markets for exports of manufactures, the 
establishment of investment relationships which could generate significant profits over time and 
diplomatic influence. But leadership from African governments, particularly to strengthen 
domestic policies and governance and to harmonize regional policies so as to improve the 
continent’s bargaining position with China, are required to ensure that the China-Africa 
relationship contributes to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The twin goals of this book 
are to analyze the economic exchange between China and Africa, and to outline policy 
recommendations to improve the benefits to both parties.  
This overview summarizes the book’s key messages and policy recommendations. The first 
section describes the changing nature of China’s development role in Africa over the last six 
decades, while the second provides a snapshot of relations today. The third section analyzes the 
impact of trade with China on Africa’s trade, and the fourth reviews China’s investment in 
African infrastructure. The fifth section highlights the complementary between China and 
traditional development partners, while the sixth underlines the need to improve governance to 
ensure that Africa derives the maximum benefit from the development opportunity provided by 
China. The final section provides a range of recommendations for African countries and China, 
and considers how the African Development Bank Group can be instrumental in supporting the 
deepening of China-Africa relationships.  
2. An Evolving Partnership  
China’s history of engagement with Africa can be traced back to the 15
th Century when Chinese 
traders visited East Africa. But the foundation for modern day Sino-African relationships was 
built in the post colonial period, when China enlarged its cooperation framework with Africa as 
part of its efforts to demonstrate solidarity with developing countries. The classic example of 
Chinese support was the $400 million, interest-free loan provided over 1970-75 for the landmark 
1,800 km Tanzania-Zambia railways. This was a large sum for China, which was poorer than   7
most African countries in the 1970s. China also financed several showcase projects, such as 
football stadiums and public buildings.  
Beginning with China’s opening to the world under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the 
Sino-African engagement became less driven by ideological interests and more by commercial 
viability. Rising living standards and industrialization dramatically increased the consumption of 
energy and raw materials, raising China’s dependence on imports of oil and minerals, in part 
from Africa. China’s trade with African economies boomed, reaching almost 10 percent of 
Africa’s trade in 2008. 
Chinese outward FDI is supported by the government’s “Going global strategy”, which assists 
Chinese enterprises in becoming global multinationals through providing soft loans and other 
assistance to foreign investment projects, in particular in emerging markets. Chinese investments 
in foreign countries are often driven by enterprises with majority ownership by central, 
provincial or municipal governments. Although these enterprises are officially in the hands of the 
public sector, they operate frequently as private sector entities and typically seek to maximize 
profits and set wages of managers and workers at a competitive level.  
Chinese banks have been increasingly involved in providing financial services to facilitate trade 
and investment projects in Africa. Most prominently, the China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADF) was established in 2007 by the China Development Bank (CDB) as a $5 billion equity 
investment fund to assist Chinese companies in expanding into Africa.  Beneficiaries have 
included Sinosteel Corporation, China National Building Material and Hainan Airlines. The 
CADF also supports companies in the Chinese Economic Processing Zones in Zambia and 
Mauritius (future zones are currently being discussed in Nigeria, Tanzania, Liberia and Cape 
Verde.) These investments contribute to African development while helping China to diversify 
its $2 trillion external assets, currently mainly invested in foreign Treasury bonds with relatively 
low yields.  
The expansion of Chinese commercial activities in Africa has led to a shift in public policy from 
a narrow focus on trade and investment relations to a broad range of development issues. China 
has pledged to expand its zero tariff treatment to 95 percent of the products of African least 
developed countries, and to provide $1 billion in loans to small and medium size enterprises. At 
the 2009 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China pledged $10 billion in   8
concessional loans to Africa and emphasized the need to support Africa’s efforts to attain the 
Millennium Development Goals, address climate change, and overcome challenges in the areas 
of food security, energy security and epidemic diseases. China provides Africa about $1.5-2 
billion a year in aid (as defined by DAC’s criteria for ODA), mainly allocated to countries with 
longstanding political ties to China (e.g. Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania) and resource-rich 
countries (e.g. Algeria, Angola, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, 
and Zambia).  
China is also going through a “development cooperation” learning curve with regard to its 
various aid, preferential trade access, soft loans and investment instruments. The evolution of 
Chinese assistance will not mean simply copying the aid modalities of traditional development 
partners, such as untied aid, conditionality, and budget support. However, it is likely that aid 
coordination with traditional donors will increase, and that China will pay increasing attention to 
the implications of its assistance for governance and the environment. It is important for Africa 
to engage China in its consideration of development cooperation policies, to ensure that China’s 
aid is effective and complements, rather than competes with, aid from traditional donors.  
3. An Unbalanced Exchange  
China’s burgeoning trade and investment relationship with Africa does not benefit all sectors or 
countries equally. About 70 percent of Africa’s exports to China come from Angola, South 
Africa, Sudan, and the DRC, and are heavily dominated by raw materials (e.g. oil, copper, 
cobalt, and cotton). And 60 percent of imports from China, largely manufactures, are destined to 
South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco. Most other African economies have only a 
limited trade relationship with China. Chinese outward FDI to Africa shows a similar pattern of 
concentration, with 50 percent flowing to the mining sectors of just a handful of resource-rich 
countries (Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan). 
The trade and investment relationship between China and Africa is unbalanced, in the sense that 
Africa is less important to China than other trading partners. China is closely integrated with 
Asia, in particular through the trade in components, a key element of the export manufacturing 
sector of this country (whereby components of manufacturing goods are first imported to China 
from another Asian country, then assembled, and subsequently re-exported to consumer markets 
in Europe, North America and Japan). Thus Asia accounts for more than 50 percent of China’s   9
trade, compared to only 4 percent for Africa. Fundamentally, however, African exports are 
limited by domestic constraints, including inadequate infrastructure, burdensome regulatory 
requirements, and a lack of skilled labor. 
Africa also faces substantial competition from other regions in the commodity sector. China has 
diverse sources for raw materials, including from Africa, Australia (where China has also 
devoted large minerals-related investment), the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Latin 
America. China’s trade with Latin America reached $144 billion in 2008 (compared to $104 
billion for Africa), supported by Latin America’s abundant raw material and agricultural 
products, as well its large consumer market. Thus Africa is in competition with regions which 
are equally endowed with natural resources and with more stable business and political 
environments and lower investment risks. This interregional competition emphasizes the 
importance of strengthening competitiveness and addressing structural challenges in Africa. 
Taking into consideration trade, investment, and aid, China obviously plays an important role in 
increasing Africa’s development opportunities, but not to the extent of Africa’s traditional 
donors. The European Union and the United States are still the largest trade and investment 
partners for many African economies. The EU accounts for over 30 percent of Africa’s exports, 
and donors in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) provide $36 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
Africa (and finance the bulk of the additional $18 billion from multilateral donors). By 
comparison, China accounts for about 10 percent of Africa’s exports while China’s aid to Africa 
(defined according to DAC criteria) is about $1.5-2 billion.  
4. China’s Impact on African Trade 
The impact of China varies according to the very diverse size, economic structures, and quality 
of governance and institutions in African economies. China’s impact is probably greatest on 
resource-rich economies who benefit from China’s demand for raw materials, and probably 
smallest on the more diverse African economies. One approach to measuring the costs and 
benefits of China’s trade with African countries is to compare each country’s comparative 
advantage (what goods the country exports to the world) with the commodity intensity of trade 
with China.  Countries that export primarily oil (e.g. Angola, Gabon, Sudan and new oil 
producing countries such as Chad and Uganda) benefit from Chinese demand without facing   10
competition from Chinese exports in global markets.  On the other hand, African countries that 
export manufactures, such as tobacco products (Benin), refined oil products (Algeria, Egypt and 
Kenya), manufactured wood products (Cameroon) and processed food (Mauritius) face Chinese 
competition on the global market but little demand from China.   
China’s intense competition in manufacturing and its rising demand for oil underlines the risk 
that Africa may remain specialized in raw materials and thus remain vulnerable to volatile 
commodity prices. However, Africa also reaps substantial benefits from its commodity revenues, 
and China’s manufactured exports reduce the price of consumer goods and industrial inputs in 
Africa.  
China is supporting export diversification in Africa through the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones located in Zambia and Mauritius, with future sites under consideration in North 
and East Africa.  The Special Economic Zones should attract considerable investments in 
infrastructure (especially transport and power) and export-oriented production, which could 
provide some impetus to local manufacturing industries (see box 1). However, for these zones to 
promote industrialization effectively requires integrating Chinese investments in the national 
production chain through backward and forward linkages. Strong domestic policy frameworks, 
including strong governance, a competitive economic environment, and the availability of skilled 
workers, are essential to encourage such linkages and enable African economies to move up the 
value added chain. African governments also need to ensure effective coordination of donor 
activities to support such efforts.   
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5. African Integration and Infrastructure   
African integration has over time become a priority for policy makers on the African continent. 
This aspiration was strengthened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, when regions that were 
more integrated in Africa, such as Eastern Africa, suffered a less severe economic downturn 
compared to other regions.  Some of the main challenges for further African integration, and for 
efficient production, include inadequate transport, telecommunication, and power. The Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) estimates that infrastructure financing of $93 billion a 
There is a strong interest by African leaders to replicate the successful experience of China in 
planning, developing and implementing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign 
investments and enhance the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Consequently, Chinese 
investments in SEZs have been welcomed by many countries as a means of benefiting from Chinese 
capital as well as proven experience and expertise in SEZ development and management. Moreover, 
governments are hoping that the SEZs will generate spillovers in terms of skills and technology that 
will benefit domestic enterprises and enhance their competitiveness in regional and global markets. 
 
Under the 2006 “going out (zou chuqu) policy”, China is actively supporting the establishment of 
SEZs abroad. The stated objectives are to improve domestic and regional markets for Chinese 
products and services, leverage trade and preferential market access arrangements, assist domestic 
industrial restructuring in China by relocating mature labor-intensive manufacturing to other 
countries, create economies of scale for foreign investments by supporting clusters of Chinese 
companies and create supply chains, and respond positively to the interest from foreign countries to 
learn from the Chinese experience with mutual benefits for China and the host countries. 
 
However, Chinese-operated SEZs in Sub-saharan Africa thus far show low levels of investment and 
exports, and their job creation impacts and integration with the local economy have been limited. This 
disappointing performance is partly due to the slow pace of implementation of China’s SEZs in 
Africa. A recent study on Chinese-operated zones in Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Nigeria (World Bank, 
forthcoming) derives several recommendations in order to accerate and improve the zone 
development efforts.  African governments and zone developers should: (i) strengthen the 
coordination between political commitments and the business and financial planning of the 
developers; (ii) address financing gaps which delay the development of the zones; (iii) strengthen 
legal and regulatory arrangements, including social and environmental safeguards, to more effectively 
support zone development; (iv) ensure delivery of external infrastructure critical to zone success, such 
as access roads, energy, water, waste management, ICT and port facilities; (v) improve access of local 
companies and workers to the zones to ensure linkages to the local economy; (vi) foster integration of 
the zone master plans into regional urban development plans to enhance economic and social benefits; 
and (vii) improve communications and outreach strategies to garner public and investor support.  
 
Source: World Bank, “Chinese Investments in Special Economic Zones in Africa: Progress, 
Challenges and Lessons Learned”, Washington DC, forthcoming.   12
year over the next decade, divided equally between investment and maintenance, is required to 
achieve national development targets.  
Total commitments for infrastructure in Africa in 2009 were $38.4 billion, slightly up by 5.0%, 
from $36.6 billion in 2008. The total commitments made by Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
(ICA) members for infrastructure in Africa in 2008 were $19.5 billion, half of the total volume 
and a significant increase, by 42.5% ($5.8 billion) compared to the previous year. Private sector 
support has decreased again, by around 23.7% to about $11.4 billion, indicating a difficult 
investment climate and the impact of the financial crisis. Examples of private sector infrastructure 
investments include the Dakar Container Terminal and the Main One Cable system. The latter 
will increase internet access at lower cost to West Africa. China typically supports critical 
sectors that are underfunded by traditional donors.  
Chinese investments are mainly channeled through the Export-Import Bank of China (China 
EXIM Bank), which is the lending arm of the Chinese government. These investments include 
the 2008 multi-billion dollars resources-for-infrastructure package, which finances much-needed 
infrastructure (including railway tracks, roads, hydroelectric dams, airports, schools and clinics) 
in exchange for copper and cobalt concessions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The China 
Exim Bank has extended loans and grants for commercial projects in over 35 African countries, 
in particular in Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia. The Bank also finances investment projects 
and partners in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the power sector (a key element of regional 
integration due to economies of scale), including large-scale projects such as the 400MW Bui 
Dam in Ghana, the 360MW Kariba North Bank hydro project in Zambia, and the 1,250 MW 
Merowe Dam project in the Sudan. Overall, some 30 African countries have received Chinese 
funding towards hydropower and power stations.  
Moreover, China offers highly competitive prices on goods and services for investment projects, 
due to lower wages than their Western counterparts and low interest rate loans from public sector 
banks. Chinese firms also have a good record for on-time completion, compared to projects 
undertaken by other countries. Africa can thus benefit from Chinese participation through low 
prices and efficient work.  
Similar to many projects from traditional donors, China’s investments have at times emphasized 
the construction of new facilities, while not necessarily addressing long term sustainability issues   13
such as maintenance and capacity building. If this is not addressed it is likely that new 
investments will not be adequately maintained. For example, the Tanzania-Zambia railway 
project, which was completed ahead of schedule, was a spectacular engineering achievement, 
laying over 1800 kilometers of tracks (in part through mountainous terrain) and building 320 
bridges. However, due to mismanagement and underinvestment over the last three decades, the 
railway company fell into financial difficulties and the facilities have been under-utilized.  
China’s infrastructure investments could be more supportive of African integration. China 
typically works on a bilateral basis in support of national infrastructure plans that may not 
adequately take into account potential benefits from regional cooperation.  In exceptional cases, 
China has supported major regional infrastructure ventures such as the electricity transmission 
lines between southern African countries. On occasions, China has provided a framework for 
regional projects, including in the power generation projects, power interconnection, road 
projects, port projects, railways and ICT networks. However, often regional projects are 
overlooked.    
6. China’s Impact on the Global Aid Architecture  
China is often called an “emerging donor”, although it has had an aid program since the 1950s. 
Analyzing the impact of China on the global aid architecture is difficult because several 
government institutions are involved in concessional finance and China does not report aid 
according to the definitions adopted by the DAC (which requires for classification as ODA, 
among other conditions, that the loan or grant is intended for development and has a minimum 
grant element). Using the OECD-DAC criteria, China’s aid program is estimated at between $1.5 
and $2 billion. Other flows of development finance, such as preferential export credits, or 
government subsidies for foreign direct investment, may look similar to ODA, but would be 
classified as “Other Official Flows (OOF)” under the OECD-DAC definition. 
There are important differences between OECD-DAC and China development cooperation. 
China’s “ODA” as well as “OOF” are often provided as tied aid, while about 90 percent of ODA 
from traditional development partners is provided in an untied manner. Within OECD-DAC, 
only Korea, which only became member of the DAC in November 2009, provides nearly all its 
assistance in a tied manner. Although Chinese goods and services are highly competitive 
compared to those from OECD/DAC members’ countries, in some cases the tying of aid could   14
reduce value for money and undermine the recipient countries’ ownership of development 
projects. Also, China does not provide assistance in the form of budget support, which by 
reducing administrative costs, is high appreciated by the recipient government, as it can be an 
effective instrument for aid delivery. In 2008 traditional development partners provided $5.4 
billion in general budget support.  More broadly, many traditional development partners tend to 
be more sensitive to the overall policy framework when determining aid levels. China’s focus, by 
contrast, is to support individual investment projects, while policies to encourage long-term 
development are viewed as the responsibility of the recipient country.   
These differences have become important in the donors’ approach to debt sustainability. The 
Enhanced Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) have achieved substantial reductions in the debt burden facing poor countries, 
while supporting policy reform. China has a separate initiative to write off 168 loans owed by 33 
African countries, but at the same time continues to provide relatively hard terms on some loans.  
Some traditional donors are concerned that China’s project lending could raise debt levels again, 
which would be contrary to the debt sustainability objective of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  
The case of the DRC, which had to amend the terms of its financing agreement with China to 
quality for debt relief, has been the most publicized. There is something to be said for both 
perspectives. Traditional donors are understandably unwilling to make financial sacrifices to 
reduce poor countries’ debt burden in the interest of increasing resources to the social sectors, if 
recipient countries then rebuild their debt levels in order to finance infrastructure investments. 
On the other hand, countries like the DRC could benefit from higher investment, even on 
commercial terms, as long as the return on the project is adequate. Greater coordination between 
China and traditional donors could help to resolve such issues. Possibilities include China’s 
participation in forums such as the Paris and London Club, in the Debt Management Facility 
(which coordinates debt sustainability analysis among multinational development institutions), 
and in consultative group meetings. The China-DAC forum also provides a platform for 
exchange of best practices in development cooperation.  
7. Governance and African Civil Society Engagement 
The ability of African economies to translate the opportunities offered by China into sustainable 
development and poverty reduction depends critically on strengthening African governance and 
the business environment.  Progress will require not only leadership by African governments, but   15
also participation and oversight by the African private sector and civil society organizations (see 
box 2).  The policy framework that would maximize the benefits from foreign investment will 
differ, according to the individual circumstances and institutions of each African country.   
Whatever policies are adopted to improve the development impact of foreign investment should 
be applied to all foreign investors, not just Chinese. 
Some African countries have implemented policies to increase the local benefits of foreign 
investment (including from China). For example, Tanzania insisted on the employment of 
unskilled Tanzanian workers on projects receiving foreign finance, Angola required the use of 
local construction material, and Senegal emphasized that investors should partner with local 
firms when submitting bids. However, such requirements need to be accompanied by transparent 
procurement and effective project management to ensure value for money. 
Governance provides a good example of the different perspectives of China and traditional 
donors, referred to above. China considers intervention in aid recipients’ domestic politics as an 
infringement of sovereignty, while traditional donors emphasize that aid is more effective in 
countries with good governance. Thus the majority of traditional development partners include 
good governance criteria, for example as shown in the World Bank’s and African Development 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings, in their development cooperation 
policies. This is the most evident in budget support operations, which often focus on 
transparency, good governance and budget execution.  
    16
Income and democracy in China (1972-2009) 
Source : adapted from World Development indicators and Freedom House dataset. Note : 
Index of democracy is the Freedom House average scores of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, negatively ranged from 1 (best) to 7 (worst) 
Box 2: Development and Democracy 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Few will dispute the tremendous growth performance that China has achieved since the 1970s. A 
look at official statistics reveals that China 
has sustained consistently high growth 
rates, allowing the country to multiply its 
GDP per capita income by 17 between 
1972 and 2009. There is much less 
evidence, however, on whether democracy 
in China has improved correspondingly. 
Figure 1 shows that the Freedom House 
score of democracy has been stagnating 
around 6-7 for more than three decades.  
 
The literature on the causal link between 
democracy, development and economic 
performance has not been conclusive. 
Competing theoretical and empirical 
studies have yielded few robust 
conclusions supporting the different hypotheses: "democracy facilitate development/growth", 
"democracy hinders development/growth" and "there is no clear relationship between democracy 
and development outcomes".  
 
The reverse linkage between democracy and development outcomes, that is the causal effect of 
the income level on democracy has also failed to operate in China so far. Modernization theory 
claims that countries will become more democratic as they become richer. The key elements of 
this hypothesis is that richer countries are more willing to promote democratic values and more 
receptive to democratic political tolerance norms. A number of studies have followed up this 
theory by recognizing that the level of income is an important background condition for 
democracy although the exact form of the relationship is still a matter of debate. This theory has 
however received mixed empirical support. While Barro and Helliwell find that improvements in 
the standard of living (or income level) favor democracy (as measured by a subjective indicator 
of electoral rights, political rights and civil liberties), Acemoglu highlights with postwar data, 
that when the factors that simultaneously affect income and democracy are controlled for, the 
strong cross-country correlation between democracy and a high level of income does not result in 
a causal effect on income on democracy.  
Several institutional factors, which are not related to democracy, have supported China’s rapid 
growth in the last three decades, including gradual economic liberalization, relative political 
stability since 1979, and the dismantling of the commune system in rural areas. Even though 
more and more research is focusing on the sustainability of the Chinese economy’s success 
without sound governance-enhancing institutional reforms, China’s experience stresses the 
importance of institutional reforms that are needed to initiate and sustain growth, particularly 
market reforms.  
Source: Kangoye, T. (2008), Instability from trade and democracy: the long-run effect of aid. 
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 41 pp. 1-16. 
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Tension is particularly evident in China’s support for extractive industries, which are particularly 
prone to corruption because of the huge revenues involved and often centralized government 
control. The development impact of investments in the extractive sector could be enhanced 
through more transparency in the procurement and contracting process and more active 
engagement of African civil society organizations in oversight. In this regard, there is already a 
well established role for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which could be 
expanded to Chinese companies.  
China’s concern with the overall policy framework, and particularly the quality of the 
environment, may be increasing. While problematic relations between Chinese companies and 
African civil society organizations have involved violent strikes (as in Zambia), recently it 
appears that Chinese companies are becoming more sensitive to corporate social responsibility 
and are starting to focus on the “triple bottom line” (profit, social, environmental). Lenders such 
as China Exim-Bank are already aware of the importance of social responsibility and 
implementation of social and economic safeguards.  
Finally, it is important to strengthen national capacity in negotiating favorable natural resource 
deals with China. A few decades ago Botswana successfully used international consultants from 
highly regarded legal firms to negotiate favorable contracts for its natural resources with 
DeBeers, a South African mining giant. This approach could be emulated by African countries in 
negotiating long term deals with Chinese companies, in a particular if these include “mortgaging 
future revenues” for needed development projects.  
8. Conclusion and Recommendations 
China is a valuable trading partner, a source of investment financing, and an important 
complement to traditional development partners. China is investing massively in infrastructure, 
which helps alleviate supply bottlenecks and improve competitiveness. For China, Africa is not 
only a source of critical commodities necessary to expand its domestic economy, but also a 
future investment destination for labor intensive manufacturing, especially given that wages are 
rising much faster in China than in African. The following recommendations for African 
countries, China and the African Development Bank Group are intended to improve the mutual 
gains from African-Chinese cooperation.  
   18
African Countries should:  
•  Improve coordination between aid and investments from China and from traditional 
development partners.  
•  Enhance technology transfer and maximize the positive spillover effects from foreign 
investment through local labor and content requirements, as is done in several African 
countries.  
•  Achieve greater export diversification by identifying niche markets for African 
manufacturing products in China, and by expanding preferential trade access to Chinese 
markets.  
•  Build negotiation capacity, for example by obtaining specialized legal services, to ensure 
that large, complex commodity deals with China can be negotiated with favourable terms 
for the exporting African country.     
•  Build backward and forward linkages between the domestic economy and the Special 
Economic Zones supported by Chinese investment. 
China should: 
•  Prioritize the development challenges of Africa within the established FOCAC 
framework, including addressing issues such as food insecurity, climate change and 
adaptation technology and infrastructure.  
•  Integrate “best practices” of traditional development partners, notably through the China-
DAC Group, which would share knowledge on development finance.  
•  Coordinate Chinese aid and investment flows more centrally instead of the current 
practice where over 20 Ministries, public banks and agencies provide support to Africa. 
A good example might be South Korea, which is also an emerging development partner, 
where aid is coordinated jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance.  
•  Support additional investment in Africa in labor intensive manufacturing industries. 
Currently, as wages are rising in China, labor intensive manufacturing is “relocating” to 
other Asian countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam.    19
•  Coordinate with multilateral and bilateral institutions on debt sustainability analyses and 
debt relief.  
•  Untie aid gradually and open bids to international tender. This approach would enhance 
transparency, development effectiveness and ownership by the recipient African country.  
•  Enhance communication between management of Chinese-owned enterprises in Africa 
and African civil society organizations, including labour unions. Often these tensions 
reflect different traditions in Africa and China concerning engagement with civil society 
organizations, as well as cultural and linguistic differences. One way to improve African 
understanding of Chinese policies is to expand scholarship opportunities for Africans to 
study in China.  
•  Expand the implementation of the “Equator principals”, a voluntary set of standards for 
determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing, 
to Chinese investments. This approach could reduce tensions with local civil society 
groups as well as improve the sustainability of projects financed by China.  
•  Elevate China’s status in the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) from an observer 
to full membership. This would enable better coordination between various infrastructure 
projects financed by China and traditional development partners.  
The African Development Bank Group should: 
•  Support the deepening of the China-Africa development relationship within the FOCAC 
framework. This could include establishment of a core group of African countries, akin to 
the committee of ten (or C10) financial Ministers and central bank governors, to present 
regional views on key issues such as regional infrastructure projects, untying of aid, 
expansion of preferential trade access and coordination of debt relief. 
•  Leverage the Bank Group’s expertise and operational experience in key areas identified 
in the FOCAC, namely, food security, climate change and adaptation technology, African 
integration and infrastructure.  
•  Implement further the Memorandums of Understanding between the African 
Development Bank Group, and respectively, the China EXIM Bank and the China’s   20
Development Bank. These Memorandums of Understanding focus on issues such as: (i) 
exchange of information regarding each other's respective activities in Africa; (ii) sharing 
of development knowledge and experience; (iii) providing co-financing or guarantee of 
public and possibly private sector investment projects; (iv) exchange or secondment of 
professional staff; (v) joint regional, country, economic and sector studies; and (vi) aid 
harmonization, development policy and strategy coordination.  
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